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This article details fundamental aspects of habits, beginning with the fact that habits are 
dynamic patterns that are learned, and that in coincidence with this learning, habits of 
mind are formed, as in the formation of expectations, thus of certain if/then relationships. 
it points out that, in quite the opposite manner of the practice of phenomenology, 
the strange is made familiar in the formation of habits. it shows how clear-sighted 
recognition of the seminal significance of movement and phenomenologically-grounded 
understandings of movement are essential to understandings of habits and the habits 
of mind that go with them. The article differentiates non-developmentally achieved 
habits from developmentally achieved habits, but elucidates too the relationship 
between instincts and habits. it elucidates the relationship in part by showing how, 
contra merleau-Ponty, “in man” there is a “natural sign”—or rather, natural signs. 
By relinquishing an adultist stance and delving into our common infancy and early 
childhood, we recognize the need for what husserl terms a “regressive inquiry” and 
thereby recover ‘natural signs’ such as smiling, laughing, and crying. at the same 
time, we honor husserl’s insight that “habit and free motivation intertwine.” as the 
article shows, resolution of the relationship between habit and free motivation requires 
recognition of nonlinguistic corporeal concepts that develop in concert with synergies 
of meaningful movement, concepts and synergies achieved not by embodied minds but 
mindful bodies. 
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Brushing one’s teeth, tying a shoelace or knot, hammering a nail and not 
one’s thumb, writing one’s name, walking down stairs—each is a distinctive 
qualitative dynamic, a sequence of movements that has a distinctive 
beginning, a distinctive contour with distinctive intensity changes, for 
example, and a distinctive end. each is a dynamic pattern of movement. we 
are born with none of these dynamic patterns, which is to say that they are 
not ready-made or innate in any sense. each is learned.
There is a lesson to be learned from this existential truth, namely, that 
whatever habits we develop in what we do and the way we do things, they 
exist because we learn the dynamics that constitute them, whether by trial 
and error, by assiduous practice, by resting and taking up the challenge 
again at a later time, or whatever. The mode of one’s learning may vary, 
but the formation of a habit in each instance is basically an enlargement 
of one’s kinetic repertoire, which is to say that one can form a habit only 
by learning a new dynamic pattern of movement. in the beginning, the 
formation is ordinarily a spontaneous developmental given, i.e., infants 
are not told how to do such and such nor are they told  they must learn to 
do such and such in the first place—they would not understand anyway if 
they were told, for infants are precisely “without speech.” infants indeed 
initiate their own learning by first of all learning their bodies and learning 
to move themselves (Sheets-Johnstone 1999a/expanded 2nd ed. 2011). They 
do so without an owner’s manual as well as without instructions from 
others, a manual that would state, for example, ‘lift and move your right foot 
forward, then gradually take weight on it as you peel off your left foot-- the 
foot that is now behind you--from heel to toe,’ and so on, and so on. infants 
learn quite by themselves to reach effectively, to grasp objects effectively, 
to walk, to feed themselves, and ultimately, to talk and thereby exceed their 
classification as infants. Habits of mind proceed in concert with these habit-
formed and -informed accomplishments, most basically in expectations, i.e., 
in if/then relationships, of which more presently. 
The formation of habits proceeds in just the opposite manner of the 
practice of phenomenology. in doing phenomenology, that is, in following 
its methodology, we not only make the familiar strange, but do so in part 
by disenfranchising our habits, i.e., by bracketing, by “renounc[ing] all 
erudition, in a lower or higher sense” (husserl 1989, p. 96).  across the 
spectrum of human cultures, that is, in the most basic ontological sense 
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that includes every human, habits are indeed a matter of having made the 
strange familiar. That familiarity becomes ingrained in what husserl terms 
the psychophysical unity of animate organisms and their ways of living in 
the world. in more precise terms, habits develop by bringing what was out 
of reach and/or beyond understanding effectively and efficiently into the 
realm of the familiar and into what are basically synergies of meaningful 
movement that run off by themselves. habits are indeed grounded from 
the beginning in movement, that is, in the primal animation of animate 
organisms that gives rise to sensings and sense-makings that evolve into 
synergies of meaningful movement and habits of mind. it is hardly any 
wonder, then, that foundational understandings of habit, its origin, nature, 
and genesis, are rooted in a “regressive inquiry” (husserl 1970, p. 354) into 
ontogenetic life, or what Fink terms a “constructive phenomenology” (Fink 
1995, p. 63). 
in the course of their learning their bodies and learning to move themselves 
effectively and efficiently, infants form certain ways of “doing” that 
generate an ever-expanding repertoire of “i cans” (Sheets-Johnstone 1999a/
expanded 2nd ed. 2011, chapter 5). we might recall in this context husserl’s 
and landgrebe’s emphasis on the fact that “i move” precedes “i do” and 
“i can” (husserl 1989, p. 273; landgrebe 1977, pp. 107-108). certain ways of 
“doing” are indeed constituted in and by certain qualitatively inflected 
movement dynamics that inform an infant’s “i cans,” dynamics that create 
particular spatio-temporal-energic patterns. Just as infants nurse in 
distinctive ways and kick their legs in distinctive ways, so they ultimately 
learn to walk in distinctive ways, which is to say that the qualitative 
dynamics of one infant’s movements are different from that of another. 
Ways of moving are indeed individualized. Moreover qualitatively inflected 
movement dynamics feed into a certain style, of which more later. what is of 
immediate moment here is that self-generated dynamics are the foundation 
of developmentally achieved habits.
developmentally achieved habits are to be distinguished from non-
developmentally achieved habits, that is, habits that are not cultivated from 
the beginning through learnings of one kind and another. The distinction 
between walking and smiling or laughing is one such distinction. one 
does not learn to smile or laugh: smiling and laughter, like crying, are 
spontaneous movement patterns that arise on their own. Such spontaneous 
human movement patterns are in fact quite remarkable. as darwin 
succinctly observed, “Seeing a Baby (like hensleigh’s) smile & frown, 
who can doubt these are instinctive—child does not sneer” (Darwin 1987, 
notebook m, no. 96, p. 542). darwin’s observation is in fact of moment: the 
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relationship between instincts—what is “instinctive”--and habits warrants 
attention.
Instincts, like habits, are distinctive qualitatively inflected dynamic 
patterns. Those patterns, however, arise on different grounds. As specified 
and discussed in detail elsewhere with respect to infants and animate 
forms of life more generally (Sheets-Johnstone 2008, pp. 349-367), what 
merleau-Ponty terms “natural signs,” including “the realm of instinct,” 
are part of the heritage of humans, merleau-Ponty’s dismissal of them to 
the contrary. as noted in that discussion, “when merleau-Ponty writes 
that ‘in man there is no natural sign’, and that ‘[i]t would be legitimate to 
speak of “natural signs” only if the anatomical organization of our body 
produced a correspondence between specific gestures and given “states 
of mind”’ (merleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 188-189), he is surprisingly oblivious of 
the dynamic congruity that binds movement and emotions, the kinetic and 
the affective (Sheets-Johnstone 1999b/2009). a nervous laugh might simply 
burst forth, for example, when one feels less than full assurance about what 
one is doing or how one is to answer to a question, just as a free lower leg 
might begin swinging or jiggling when one is seated and feeling bored or 
eager to get up and leave a lecture or meeting of some kind. while such 
bodily happenings might not be countenanced as instincts, they are without 
doubt natural signs, instances of spontaneous, involuntarily produced 
movements--“specific gestures”--tied to affective feelings--“given ‘states of 
mind’.” adult instances aside, with respect to infant life, smiling, laughing, 
and crying are clearly the spontaneous expression of human nature: they 
are natural signs. They are, as darwin indicates, instinctive beginning forms 
of sociality that are spontaneously generated; they are neither self-taught 
nor other-taught. They may certainly be honed, however, and in habitual 
intentional ways, as when an infant cries because it has learned all by itself 
that crying brings its mother or caretaker to it, or, when as a child in later 
years, it learns to feign a smile when greeting a certain adult person it 
does not like, or, when as an adult in still later years, it learns to restrain 
a laugh at a child’s continuing awkwardness in order not to dissuade him 
or her from trying to do something. as is evident by such cries, feignings, 
and restrainings, humans can and do develop certain habits by choice 
on the basis of what was originally instinctive. instincts may thus be the 
generating ground of habits, precisely as in crying to bring someone to 
you, in feigning a smile at someone you actually dislike, or in restraining a 
laugh in deference to embarrassing another. moreover somatic responses 
(Johnstone 2012, 2013) such as shivering from cold are natural signs that 
may generate a habitual running to get a sweater or slippers, or to close 
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a window or turn up the thermostat, or in other words, to do something 
rather than nothing in fear that one might be catching a cold. in short, what 
is basically instinctive and thus involuntary becomes open to modulations 
in later years, that is, to voluntary implementations that may and often do 
become habitual in certain circumstances.
wholly voluntary learnings have no such roots in instincts or instinctive 
dispositions. indeed, when children and adults voluntarily take up a new 
skill and in the process form new qualitatively inflected dynamic patterns 
that become habitual —when they learn to write, to type, to jump rope, 
to play the clarinet, to drive, to make a surgical incision, and so on— their 
learnings have no underlying ‘natural signs’. in actual practice, however, 
their learned patterns are also modulated according to circumstance; they 
are open to variation depending on the particular situation of the moment 
and altered accordingly, as in making an abdominal incision or a spinal 
incision, or as in writing one’s name with a piece of chalk on a blackboard or 
signing one’s name with a pen on a house purchase contract.
There is a basic dimension of instincts, however, that warrants attention. 
in their pristine mode, i.e., before being possibly transformed by learnings 
of one kind and another, instincts are properly analyzed as self-organizing 
dynamics that flow forth experientially in spontaneous movement 
dispositions, thus basically, not just the spontaneous movement disposition 
of a fetus to move its thumb toward its mouth and not toward its ear or 
navel, for example, but the spontaneous disposition to move in and of itself in 
the first place, including movement of the neuromuscular system itself as 
it forms in utero. Such movement is not “action” nor is it “behavior.” it 
is the phenomenon of movement pure and simple—a phenomenon that in 
truth is not so simple when analyzed phenomenologically in descriptive 
experiential terms, that is, as a phenomenon in its own right. indeed, this 
pure and simple phenomenon is incredibly complex, far more complex 
than the terms ‘action’ or ‘behavior’ suggest when they are implicitly and 
largely unwittingly used in its place, as in talk and writings of “action 
in perception” (nöe 2004). along similar lines, neither does “embodied 
movement” come close to a recognition of the phenomenological complexity 
of movement, even as in an attempt to abbreviate husserl’s consistent 
specification of the two-fold articulation of perception and movement 
(husserl 1989) by stating, “our embodied movement participates in seeing, 
touching, hearing, etc., thereby informing our perceptual grasp on the 
world” (gallagher and Zahavi 2012, p. 109).
husserl did not plumb the dynamic depths and complexities of movement, 
understandably so, however. his central though certainly not exclusive 
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concern was cognition and the build-up of our knowledge of the world. he 
certainly did realize the complexity of what he consistently termed “affect 
and action” and the fact that he did not explicate them fully, terming 
them at one point simply “the root soil,” “the background that is prior to all 
comportment” (husserl 1989, p. 292, p. 291, respectively).  moreover however 
briefly, he certainly did grasp the centrality of body movement to soul, 
to performance, to production, and to style. with respect to the integral 
connection of body movement and soul, he writes, “each movement of the 
Body is full of soul, the coming and going, the standing and sitting, the 
walking and dancing, etc. likewise, so is every human performance, every 
human production.”  in a Supplement to this section of ideas ii, he observes 
that “products and works” such as wielding a stick or writing a book “take 
on the spirituality of the Body,” that products and works are “psycho-
physical unities; they have their physical and their spiritual aspects, 
they are physical things that are ‘animated.” (husserl 1989, pp. 252, 333, 
respectively). Psychophysical unity and animation indeed go hand in hand 
(Sheets-Johnstone forthcoming 2014).
Precisely in his emphasis on animation and in his not just consistent but 
pivotal concern with animate organisms throughout his writings, husserl’s 
observations are clearly a beginning entry into the complex phenomenology 
of movement and its relation to instinct and habit, and this both in 
recognition of, and in going beyond the fact that “i move” precedes “i 
do” and “i can.” in particular, husserl notes that, “in original genesis, the 
personal ego is constituted not only as a person determined by drives, from 
the very outset and incessantly driven by original ‘instincts’ and passively 
submitting to them, but also as a higher, autonomous, freely acting ego, in 
particular one guided by rational motives, and not one that is merely 
dragged along and unfree. habits are necessarily formed, just as much with 
regard to originally instinctive behavior (in such a way that the power of 
the force of habit is connected with the instinctive drives) as with regard to 
free behavior” (husserl 1989, p. 267).  in short, to yield to a drive establishes 
a habit just as “to let oneself be determined by a value-motive and to resist 
a drive establishes a tendency . . . to let oneself be determined once again 
by such a value-motive (and perhaps by value-motives in general) and to 
resist these drives” (ibid.). he points out explicitly that “here habit and free 
motivation intertwine. now, if i act freely, then i am indeed obeying habit too” 
(ibid., pp. 267-68).  in effect, what i freely choose to do and do again that 
leaves a natural disposition or instinct behind is itself a habit: my freely-
formed movement itself in virtue of its repeated patterning is in a basic 
sense habitual.
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This existential reality is of moment for it indicates a substantively 
significant cognitive dimension in the formation of habits and in habits 
themselves. in more explicit terms, the intertwining of habit and free 
motivation and movement implicitly suggests habitual patterns of mind--
habitual ways of valuing and of thinking.  given the fact that “consciousness 
of the world . . . is in constant motion” (husserl 1970, p. 109), these 
habitual ways can hardly be ignored. habits of mind are surely spurred by 
expectations, for example, most basically by what husserl terms ‘if-then’ 
relationships (husserl, e.g., 1989, p. 63), and correlatively by what infant 
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist daniel Stern terms “consequential 
relationships” (Stern 1985, pp. 80-81) and what child psychologist lois 
Bloom terms “relational concepts” (Bloom 1993, pp. 50-52). insofar as these 
relationships are foundational-- “if i close my eyes, it is dark”; “if i move 
my lips and tongue in certain ways, i make and hear certain sounds”--it is 
not surprising that the relationships are foundational to everyday human 
habits, such as closing one’s eyes to go to sleep or when a light is too bright, 
and saying the words “no” and “yes.” Just such kinesthetically felt and 
cognized experiences ground the faculty that Husserl identifies as the “i-can 
of the subject” (husserl 1989, p. 13), a faculty that engenders a repertoire 
of abilities and possibilities that are indeed in many everyday instances 
habitual. More finely put in phenomenological terms, tactile-kinesthetic 
awarenesses and their invariants are realized in basic if/then relationships 
that we spontaneously discover in infancy in learning our bodies and 
learning to move ourselves. Tactile-kinesthetic awarenesses are thus a 
central aspect of animation, a tactile-kinesthetic built-in of life, a vital 
dimension in the formation of habits. 
That expectations are indeed basic to animate forms of life can hardly 
be doubted, not only in such ordinary realities that if i turn my head and 
twist my torso, then a different profile of the object at which I am looking 
comes into view, and not only in such commonly passed over realities that 
‘if i close my eyes, it is dark’, but in hearing a strange rustling in the midst 
of silence or in smelling smoke. in other words, habits of mind are also 
spurred by happenings and by particular valuings and thoughts that follow 
in response to those happenings that become standard. Though they are 
open to possible variations according to circumstance, they retain their 
basic dynamic: the bodily-felt dynamic of apprehension, for example, or 
of suspicion, and so on. in this regard they might evolve in the form of 
‘wondering if ’, for example, or ‘thinking that’, precisely as when one hears 
a strange rustling in the midst of silence and straightaway ‘wonders if ...’ or 
smells smoke and straightaway ‘thinks that...’ moreover habits of mind may 
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be defensive as well as expectant. ernest Becker, a cultural anthropologist 
who elaborated on otto rank’s conception of truth-seeking as an 
immortality ideology—Rank was a one-time disciple of Freud-- captured 
this defensive habit of mind in a striking way when he wrote about “the life-
and-death viciousness of all ideological disputes”: “each person nourishes 
his immortality in the ideology of self-perpetuation to which he gives his 
allegiance; this gives his life the only abiding significance it can have. No 
wonder men go into a rage over the fine points of belief: if your adversary 
wins the argument about truth, you die. your immortality system has been 
shown to be fallible, your life becomes fallible” (Becker 1975, p. 64). it is of 
interest to note that husserl at one point gives voice to how what Becker 
terms an “allegiance” can be an obstacle to one’s vision and understanding. 
he does so with respect to a “zoologist and naturalistic psychologist,” each 
of whom is so wedded to the “scientific attitude” or to “‘objective’ reality” 
that “[h]e wears the blinders of habit” (husserl 1989, p. 193; italics and quote 
marks in original). The blinders of habit are clearly not limited to scientists, 
but include those whose “allegiance” deters them from considering findings, 
perspectives, or ideas different from, or inimical to their own.
as the above examples suggest, through investigations of habits of mind 
with full phenomenological rigor, one might come to a description of 
mental tendencies and dispositions in valuing and thinking. yet such an 
investigation might be met with skepticism since it is possible that, even 
with the practice of free variation, mental tendencies and dispositions exist 
beyond one’s individual phenomenological capacities. in essence, one might 
thus skeptically claim that there is no valuing and thinking ‘morphology’ of 
humans akin to the real-life flesh and bone morphology of humans.1insofar 
as phenomenological inquiries are open to verification, however, 
elaborations, amendments, corrections, and so on, are certainly possible and 
in fact to be cultivated if phenomenology is to prosper. Furthermore habits 
of mind fruitfully investigated phenomenologically might be authenticated 
and possibly even refined through Buddhist Theravada meditation practice. 
Such practice has basic methodological and experiential similarities with 
phenomenology (Sheets-Johnstone 2011a).  It might thus be affirmed that 
whatever an individual’s limitations might be with respect to encompassing 
a full-scale phenomenological description of habits of mind, that 
investigation is open both to verification by other phenomenologists and to 
habits of mind discovered through a different method of inquiry and study 
that has the possibility of complementing a phenomenological investigation 
1 For perhaps similar reasons, some might claim that there is no” emotions morphology” of 
humans en par with the real-life flesh and bone morphology of humans.
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and possibly even expanding its insights.
concerns about a morphology of mind notwithstanding, the above 
discussion and examples indicate that habits of mind may be and commonly 
are formed coincident with kinetic habits, and from the beginning in 
learning one’s body and learning to move oneself. The full-scale realities 
of habit are indeed psycho-physical in nature and develop in concert 
with experience.  They are at once cognitively, affectively, and kinetically 
dynamic: they flow forth with varying intensities, amplitudes, and 
perseverations in each of these dimensions of animate life and at the same 
time as a singular whole in the habit itself. That husserl writes often of 
the “intertwining” of body and soul is revealing in this respect, perhaps 
most decisively when he affirms that “the unity of man encompasses these 
two components not as two realities externally linked with one another 
but instead as most intimately interwoven and in a certain way mutually 
penetrating (as is in fact established)” (husserl 1989, p. 100). 
in sum, what comes to mind may be and not uncommonly is habitual in 
some degree, as the above examples indicate and as psychological renditions 
of associations might furthermore show. The idea that habits of mind exist, 
however, might pose conundrum.  Such habits seem both to affirm and to 
contradict the fact that thoughts simply arise. Aficionados of the brain might 
claim that the affirmation and contradiction attest to the hegemonic nature 
of the brain; that is, they might latch on to the conundrum as a validation of 
the monarchical status of the brain and its right to experiential ascriptions 
such as “if you see the back of a person’s head, the brain infers that there is a 
face on the front of it” (crick and Koch 1992: 153). The habit of inferring arises 
and the thought “a face on the front of it” arises because the brain infers 
and says as much. This rather comically eccentric not to say preposterously 
homuncular metaphysics is clearly at odds with experience2. however much 
thoughts may and do simply arise, we are able to concentrate attention on 
a text, on a report, on a paper we are writing, on a puzzle we are trying to 
solve, on a fugue or nocturne we are trying to learn, and so on. we are at 
the same time, however, something akin to passengers with respect to what 
turns up in the process of our concentrated attention—a wayward concern 
about an upcoming meeting, a recurring concern about how a sick child 
is doing, a resurging regret about not having done something earlier. yet 
2 State ments of neurobiolo gist Semir Zeki and neurologists antonio and hanna damasio 
engender a similarly quirky metaphysics: “an object's image varies with distance, yet the brain 
can ascertain its true size” (Zeki 1992: 69); “To obtain its knowledge of what is visible, the brain 
… must actively construct a visual world” (Zeki 1992: 69); “when stimulated from within the 
brain, these systems [neural systems in the left cerebral hemisphere that “represent phonemes, 
phoneme combinations and syntactic rules for combining words”] assemble word-forms and 
generate sentences to be spoken or written” (damasio and damasio 1992: 89).
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though thoughts outside our concentration may and do arise, we surely 
control “turning toward,” as husserl emphasizes, just as he emphasizes that 
we control our attention to something, that is, our interest (or disinterest) 
in something, and we of course control what we choose to do or not to 
do. we are indeed freely-motivated and freely-moving (e.g., husserl 2001, p. 
283). These dual facts of human life are obviously of pivotal importance 
to our understandings of habit. Supposing we are sufficiently attuned to 
our affective/tactile-kinesthetic bodies, we can, for example, choose to 
change our habit of turning only toward certain things and not others, or 
of finding interest in only certain things and not others, or of doing only 
certain things and not others. These dual facts of human life are of pivotal 
importance as well to understandings of habit and its relation to style. 
husserl deftly and succinctly captures the relation of habit to style when 
he writes, “every man has his character, we can say, his style of life in 
affection and action, with regard to the way he has of being motivated by 
such and such circumstances. and it is not that he merely had this up to 
now; the style is rather something permanent, at least relatively so in the 
various stages of life, and then, when it changes, it does so again, in general, 
in characteristic way such that, consequent upon these changes, a unitary 
style manifests itself once more” (1989, p. 283). That habits are breakable, so 
to speak, and that any particular habit can be replaced by a different habit 
means that one’s style of life is precisely changeable with respect to what 
husserl terms “affection and action.” husserl’s common meaning of affection 
is tethered to “allure” and motivations (husserl 2001, p. 196), that is, to 
‘turning toward’ and ‘interest’. he writes, for example, of receiving “some 
joyful tiding and liv[ing] in the joy,” pointing out that “within the joy, we 
are “intentionally” (with feeling intentions) turned toward the joy-object as 
such in the mode of affective ‘interest’” (husserl 1989, p. 14).
Such investigations and findings conflict with present-day 
phenomenological studies that pass over kinetic and affective realities, 
and this in part because they unwittingly pass over ontogenetic realities 
of human life, choosing instead a perspective that is in truth adultist.  
Gallagher and Zahavi, for example, affirm that “[T]he sense of agency is not 
reducible to awareness of bodily movement or to sensory feedback from 
bodily movement. consistent with the phenomenology of embodiment, 
in everyday engaged action afferent or sensory-feedback signals are 
attenuated, implying a recessive consciousness of our body.” They cite 
merleau-Ponty (1962) as a reference and conclude, “i do not attend to my 
bodily movements in most actions. i do not stare at my hands as i decide 
to use them; i do not look at my feet as i walk.” Their apparent unwitting 
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appeal to vision and neglect of kinesthesia is both telling and puzzling. why 
would one stare at his or her hands in deciding “to use them” any more than 
one would look as one’s feet as one walks unless there was a pathological 
condition of some kind3. in short, when phenomenologists write as 
knowledgeable adults without ever stopping to ask themselves how they 
came to be the knowledgeable adults they are--using their hands to grasp 
a cup or towel, walking along a trail or down the street--and in turn, offer 
fine-grained phenomenological descriptions of same, they pass over the 
need for a full-scale constructive phenomenology, a phenomenology that 
might indeed at times embrace a genetic phenomenology, the latter in the 
sense of determining how we come to the meanings and values we do.
a full-scale constructive phenomenology necessarily addresses the question 
of familiarity, in particular, the nature of that familiarity that undergirds 
habits having to do with using my hands, for example, and walking.  
how indeed is it that reaching for a glass or throwing a ball, or walking 
or skipping, or moving in all the myriad habitual ways we move in our 
everyday lives, run off as what famed neurologist aleksandr romanovich 
luria termed “kinesthetic melodies” (luria 1966, 1973)? how is it that these 
melodies, with all their variations with respect to particular situations 
and circumstance, become engrained in kinesthetic memory? how indeed-
-except on the basis of  familiar qualitative dynamic patterns, particularly 
inflected patterns of movement that run off in a way not dissimilar from 
the way that husserl describes internal time consciousness “running off”? 
movement, like time, is a “temporal object,” and temporal objects “appear” 
in a wholly different way from “appearing objects”: they are precisely 
“running-off phenomena” (husserl 1964, p. 48; see also Sheets-Johnstone 
2003, 2012, forthcoming 2014). Familiar qualitative dynamic patterns are 
just such phenomena.  we may thus ask how, other than as learned patterns 
of movement, patterns learned in infancy and early childhood, such 
familiar qualitative dynamic patterns come to be? as pointed out earlier, 
infants and young children learn their bodies and learn to move themselves 
in myriad ways in the course of growing. in effect, when present-day 
phenomenologists overlook ontogeny, they overlook the very ground of 
that adult knowledge that allows them to claim “a recessive consciousness 
of our body” and to state, “i do not attend to my bodily movements in most 
actions.” indeed, an adultist stance seems generally to allow a distanced stance 
with respect to the body: “The body tries to stay out of our way so that we can 
3 one might be inclined to think that gallagher and cole’s study of ian waterman, a person 
who “does not know, without visual perception, where his limbs are or what posture he 
maintains” (Gallagher 2005, p. 44), has unwittingly influenced phenomenological practice and in 
this instance compromised it.
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get on with our task” (gallagher and Zahavi 2012, p. 163)4.
a veritable phenomenological analysis of what is going on “in most actions” 
shows something quite different. it shows that, whether a matter of 
walking or eating or dressing ourselves or drying ourselves after a shower, 
or whether a matter of myriad other everyday “actions, the dexterity, 
the precision, the fluidity, and so on, that are necessary to the “action” 
running off are engrained in kinesthetic memory in the form of an ongoing 
qualitative dynamic that is spontaneously inflected and modulated 
according to circumstance, an ongoing qualitative dynamic that was 
learned and cultivated in earlier years and is now so dynamically familiar 
that it runs off by itself. in short, whatever the everyday adult actions, 
their dynamic familiarity is anchored in the tactile-kinesthetic body and 
thus in kinesthetic memory. Their formal reality is in part related quite 
precisely to husserl distinction between an appearing object and a running 
off object: staring at one’s hands in deciding to use them or looking at one’s 
feet in walking are not equivalent to everyday synergies of meaningful 
movement, synergies that were honed from infancy and early childhood on 
and that adult humans reap in the form of “getting on with our task.” it is 
indeed not that the body “tries to stay out of our way,” but that in learning 
our bodies and learning to move ourselves, we have amassed an incredibly 
varied and vast repertoire of i cans. To overlook ontogeny is thus to fail to 
ask oneself basic questions concerning one’s adult knowledge and in turn 
foil foundational elucidations of habit. it should be added that neither 
does merleau-Ponty asks himself ontogenetic questions, basically genetic 
phenomenology questions, nor does he, in his discussion of habit, provide 
answers to the question of how habits come to be formed. on the contrary, 
merleau-Ponty declares simply that habit is “knowledge in the hands” 
(1962, p. 144) even though in the previous sentence he declares that “habit is 
neither a form of knowledge nor an involuntary action” (ibid.).
gallagher and Zahavi’s reliance on merleau-Ponty is in fact disconcerting, 
and this because, again, quite to the contrary, movement “pure and simple” 
does not surface with phenomenological clarity and depth in merleau-
Ponty’s writings. without this surfacing, genuine phenomenological 
understandings of habit are kept at bay. in a long footnote, for example, 
in which he tries to explain how motion, “which acts as a background 
to every act of consciousness, comes to be constituted,” merleau-Ponty 
4 we might in fact ask whether it is “the body” that “tries to stay out of our way,” or “we” who 
try to keep the body out of our way, or what “our way” would be had we not learned our bodies 
and learned to move ourselves and in the process forged those myriad familiar dynamic patterns 
that inform our everyday lives and that run off so effectively without our having to monitor 
them.
ON THE ORIgIN, NATURE, AND gENESIS Of HABIT
maXine SheeTS-JohnSTone  university of Oregon
108
writes, “The consciousness of my gesture, if it is truly a state of undivided 
consciousness, is no longer consciousness of movement at all, but an 
incommunicable quality which can tell us nothing about movement” 
(merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 276). moreover his earlier appeal to “the bird which 
flies across my garden” (ibid., p. 275) actually confuses movement with 
objects in motion (for a phenomenological clarification of the distinction 
between movement and objects in motion, see Sheets-Johnstone 1979) and 
leads him simply to posit “[p]re-objective being.” in short, merleau-Ponty 
too passes over the qualitative dynamics inherent in kinesthetic experience, which 
indeed are “incommunicable” only if one disregards them. merleau-Ponty 
in fact dismisses kinesthesia outright when he affirms that “As a mass of 
tactile, labyrinthine and kinaesthetic data, the body has no more definite 
orientation than the other contents of experience” (merleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 
287-288) and when, in his attempt to fathom the complexities of movement 
in relation to learning, he simply states, “a movement is learned when the 
body has understood it” (ibid.,  [1945], p. 139). his statement is in fact an 
unacknowledged near quotation from henri Bergson who wrote almost 
fifty years earlier, “A movement is learned when the body has been made 
to understand it” (Bergson 1991 [1896], p. 112).  his continuing statement 
that a movement is learned when the body “has incorporated it into its 
‘world’,” and that “to move one’s body is to aim at things through it” is taken 
up explicitly by gallagher and Zahavi. They declare, “[w]e are normally 
prepared to describe our habitual or practised (sic) movements as actions. i 
would say that ‘i hit the ball’ or ‘i played one of Beethoven’s sonatas’, rather 
than ‘the arm (or fingers) changed position in space’. But in this case the 
movements are at some level conscious. They are teleological actions which 
contain a reference to the objects at which they aim (merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 
139)” (gallagher and Zahavi, p. 174). 
a description of our “habitual or practiced movements” does not of 
course have to be, or even “normally” is,  in the past tense any more than 
it has to be described “normally” in terms of action. Phenomenological 
descriptions hew fairly consistently to the present tense of the experience 
they are describing, taking into account its temporal flow and how the 
experience comes to be constituted. Furthermore, if “habitual or practiced 
movements” are to be elucidated phenomenologically, they warrant bona 
fide phenomenological descriptions that, rather than packaging them in 
actions, do justice to their particular and unique qualitative dynamics—
whether a matter of hitting a ball, hammering a nail, playing one of 
Beethoven’s sonatas, or playing liszt’s liebestraum no. 3. Further still, 
doing phenomenological justice to “habitual or practiced movements” 
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means realizing that movement is not a matter of body parts having “changed 
position in space.” By its very nature, movement is neither positional nor 
is it simply spatial. movement is a phenomenon in its own right, a spatio-
temporal-energic phenomenon that is clearly distinguishable in essential 
ways from objects in motion, which do change position in space. To do 
phenomenological justice to the phenomenon of movement requires 
opening one’s eyes not to positional awarenesses but to the dynamics of 
change (for a phenomenological analysis of movement, see Sheets-Johnstone 
1966/1979 and 1980; Sheets-Johnstone 1999a/expanded 2nd ed. 2011).
The underlying problem in all these purported phenomenological 
descriptions of movement is a basic ignorance of movement “pure and 
simple,” meaning that complex qualitatively dynamic phenomenon that 
is opaquely subsumed in various and sundry ways in action, behavior, and 
embodiment, and that is furthermore mistakenly described as an object 
in motion and thus relegated to what amounts to no more than positional 
information of one kind and another. habits, both general human ones 
and highly personal human ones, are not reducible to changes of position 
unless, of course, one is referring to an attempt to change one’s habit of 
slouch-sitting to erect-sitting, for example. even then, kinesthesia cannot 
be ignored: that pan-human sense modality is integral to the change, not 
only to felt changed tensions but to changes in body line, i.e., changes 
in the linear design of one’s body that, as experienced, are dependent in 
part on one’s imaginative consciousness (on this latter topic, see Sheets-
Johnstone 2011b). moreover kinesthesia can hardly be ignored since it, along 
with tactility, is the first sensory modality to develop neurologically in 
utero (windle 1971) and, barring accidents, is there for life. indeed it is an 
insuppressible sensory modality.  as well-revered and internationally-known 
neuroscientist marc Jeannerod concluded in the context of examining 
“conscious knowledge about one’s actions” and experimental research that 
might address the question of such knowledge, including experimental 
research dealing with pathologically afflicted individuals, “There are no 
reliable methods for suppressing kinesthetic information arising during the 
execution of a movement” (Jeannerod 2006, p. 56).
“information” terminology aside, especially in the context not of position 
or posture but of movement, Jeannerod’s declarative finding speaks reams 
about the foundational ongoing reality and significance of kinesthesia, 
reams that should certainly lead phenomenologists to take kinesthesia 
seriously and the challenge of elucidating  its insuppressible living dynamics 
of signal importance. Puzzlingly enough, gallagher bypasses this 
very foundational reality. when he writes (gallagher 2005, p. 83), “The 
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phenomenon of newborn imitation suggests that much earlier [before later 
forms of imitation and the “mirror stage”] there is a primary notion of self, 
what we might call a proprioceptive self—a sense of self that involves a 
sense of one’s motor possibilities, body postures, and body powers, rather 
than one’s visual features”—he clearly affirms that “a primary notion of 
self” is not a visual recognition of oneself. at the same time, however, he 
bypasses the foundational reality that is the tactile-kinesthetic body, its 
neurological formation, as noted above, encompassing the first sensory 
modalities to develop5. He bypasses as well findings such as those of infant 
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist daniel n. Stern whose studies led 
him to the description of a “core self” identifiable in terms of four “self-
invariants”: self-agency, self-coherence, self-affectivity, and self-history. as 
Stern states, “in order for the infant to have any formed sense of self, there 
must ultimately be some organization that is sensed as a reference point. 
The first such organization concerns the body: its coherence, its actions, its 
inner feeling states, and the memory of all these” (Stern 1985, p. 46; see also 
Sheets-Johnstone 1999c). Though not specified as such, these invariants all 
rest on the tactile-kinesthetic body (Sheets-Johnstone 1999b/expanded 2nd 
ed. 2011). The description of each dimension indeed validates the primacy 
of movement and the tactile-kinesthetic body. recognition of this body 
would obviate the need of gallagher or any other researcher to “suggest” 
anything. on the contrary, recognition of the tactile-kinesthetic body 
straightaway gives empirical grounds for affirming that the phenomenon of 
newborn imitation is rooted in a kinetic bodily logos attuned to movement 
(see, for example, Spitz 1983 on what husserl would term the “allure” of 
movement), and further, that as that body learns, it cultivates and forges 
an ever-expanding repertoire of i cans, that habits are engendered in that 
repertoire, and that a certain style--or “character” as husserl also terms 
5 Proprioception, as first described by Sir Charles Sherrington and as taken up by many 
present-day academics (e.g., Bermudez 2003, Thompson 2007, gallagher 2005, gallagher and 
cole 1998), is basically a postural rather than kinetic sense. indeed, Sir charles Sherrington’s 
original coinage of the term and his focal emphasis define proprioception as “the perception of 
where the limb is” (Sherrington 1953, p. 249).  Proprioception provides us postural awarenesses 
and, in addition, a sense of balance through vestibular mechanisms. gallagher and cole uphold 
Sherrington’s postural specification when they explicitly state, “Proprioceptive awareness is 
a felt experience of bodily position” (gallagher and cole 1998, p. 137). gallagher and Zahavi do 
likewise when they state, “although i do not have observational access to my body in action, i 
can have non-observational proprioceptive and kinaesthetic awareness of my body in action. 
Proprioception is the innate and intrinsic position sense that i have with respect to my limbs 
and overall posture. it is the ‘sixth sense’ that allows me to know whether my legs are crossed, 
or not, without looking at them” (2012, p. 162). whatever the meaning of “non-observational . . . 
awareness of my body in action”--does “non-observational awareness” mean simply “knowing 
without looking”?--gallagher and Zahavi clearly bypass phenomenologically deepened 
understandings of the sense modality that is kinesthesia, which is to say the experience of 
movement and its qualitative dynamics.
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it--is born and being shaped in the process, a style that others readily 
recognize.
The lapses specified above indicate a call “to the things themselves.” In 
heeding the call, one is led back to husserl’s phenomenological insights. 
They are indeed an imperative beginning to bona fide understandings of 
habit, a beginning that might proceed from, but is certainly not limited to 
his conclusion that “each free act has its comet’s tail of nature” (husserl 
1989, p. 350). what husserl meant by this metaphor is that, by way of earlier 
experiences, “[t]he ego always lives in the medium of its ‘history’,” that 
“aftereffects” are present in “tendencies, sudden ideas, transformations 
or assimilations” (ibid.). This insight in particular leads most decisively 
to an appreciation of the significance of ontogenetic studies. Pathological 
case studies may enhance phenomenological understandings, but they are 
not essential in the way that phenomenologically-informed ontogenetical 
studies are essential: a constructive phenomenology is indeed essential to 
understandings of habit, just as it is essential to understandings of emotions 
and agency (on the latter topic, see e.g., Bruner 1990, Sheets-Johnstone 
1999c; on the former topic, see Sheets-Johnstone1999b, Johnstone 2012, 
2013). in fact, how “[t]he ego always lives in the medium of its ‘history’” 
is of sizeable import. husserl implicitly indicates just how central that 
history is when he brings together habit and style, and habit and the freely-
motivated, freely-moving subject. he states, “as subject of position-takings 
and of habitual convictions i have of course my style . . . i am dependent 
on my previous life and my former decisions . . . i depend on motives . . 
. i have a unique character . . . i behave according to that character in a 
regular way” (husserl 1989, p. 343). while he is clearly at pains to distinguish 
“who i am” as natural being from “who i am” as “position-taking ego,” he 
is clearly at just as sharp pains to show their relationship, in other words, 
the relationship of what he terms the freely-acting ego to “affect and 
action” (for a full discussion, see ibid., Supplement Xi, pp. 340-343). his 
emphasis on the relationship of a foundational basis in nature—a lower 
psychic level—to a position-taking Ego is succinctly put when he states that, 
“with each position-taking, there develop ‘tendencies’ to take up the same 
position under similar circumstances, etc.” (ibid., p. 293). The relationship is 
emphasized in different but related terms when, in describing “The spiritual 
ego and its underlying basis,” he points out that whatever is constituted 
naturally, i.e., in associations, tendencies, perseverations, and so on, 
permeates “all life of the spirit”: spirit “is permeated by the ‘blind’ operation 
of associations, drives, feelings which are stimuli for drives and determining 
grounds for drives . . . all of which determine the subsequent course of 
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consciousness according to ‘blind’ rules. To these laws correspond habitual 
modes of behavior on the part of the subject, acquired peculiarities (e.g., the 
habit of drinking a glass of wine in the evening)” (ibid., p. 289). it is in this 
context, several pages later (ibid., pp. 291-292) that husserl writes of the 
background that is prior to all comportment and of what we find “in the obscure 
depths”: “a root soil.” in sum, habits, including habits of mind, particularly 
for husserl in the form of motivations, are a basic dimension of a freely-
moving subject, which is to say that the “medium of its history” is integral 
to the life of a subject.
Surely it is essential for phenomenologists to attempt a regressive 
inquiry, to take an ontogenetic perspective and carry out a constructive 
phenomenology. habits are a fundamental dimension of human life. indeed, 
we could not readily live without them. if everything were new at each turn, 
if all familiarity was erased and strangeness was ever-present, life as we 
know it would be impossible. A few final words about a dimension of habit 
make the point both incisively and decisively. That dimension has to do with 
style, specifically, our common dependence on style in our interchanges 
with others and our recognition of them as individuals to begin with.
Husserl affirms, “One can to a certain extent expect how a man will 
behave in a given case if one has correctly apperceived him in his person, 
in his style” (Husserl 1989, p. 283). He offers many examples of style—not 
only in the way in which an individual judges, wills, “and values things 
aesthetically,” but in the way “’sudden ideas’ or ‘inspirations’ surge up . . . 
in the way metaphors come to him and [the way in which] his involuntary 
phantasy reigns,” and even further, “in the way he perceives in perception 
. . . [and] “in the specific way his memory ‘operates’.” In short, Husserl 
affirms that style permeates to the core and does so on the basis of habit. 
what we notice in another person’s style are precisely just such aspects 
of another person’s comportment—the ways in which he or she typically 
relates to his or her surrounding world, thus not only the way in which a 
person “behaves,” i.e., his or her typical kinetic qualitative dynamics, but 
the things the person typically values, his or her typical lines of thought, 
what he or she typically notices, and so on. moreover husserl includes in 
a person’s style his or her “turning of attention,” a turning that, husserl 
states, “is also a ‘comportment’,” but is not a position-taking as are other 
aspects of the person’s style. yet here too, as husserl observes, “the subject 
displays his ‘peculiarity’, i.e., in what it is that rivets his attention and how 
it does so . . . [how] [o]ne subject jumps easily from object to object, from 
theme to theme; another one remains attached for a long time to the same 
object, etc.” (ibid., p. 291). in sum, husserl’s observations pertain to a social 
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world. we indeed seem to be more aware of the habits of others than of our 
own habits. we do so to a sizeable extent on the basis of the movement of 
others, what we in a packaging way term their “behavior,” but which we 
get a glimpse of in terms such as “jumping easily from object to object” in 
contrast to “remain[ing]attached for a long time to the same object.” The 
qualitative dynamics of another are perceived. They are integral dimensions 
of his or her style. we can thus anticipate what another will likely do given 
such and such a situation. There is a certain familiarity about the person 
that is simply there, evidenced in the dynamics of his or her comportment 
across our history with them, hence dynamics that we have experienced 
before and have now come to expect. it should be noted that we do not 
anticipate ourselves in the way we anticipate others. as indicated above, we 
are commonly less aware of our own qualitative dynamics than we are of 
the qualitative dynamics of others-- unless we have attuned ourselves to our 
own movement.
when we begin not with an adultist perspective and speculative entities 
to explain various phenomena, but with a veritable reconstructive or 
constructive phenomenology that allows one to “get back” to those 
nonlinguistic days in which we learned our bodies and learned to move 
ourselves and in the process formed nonlinguistic corporeal concepts in 
concert with synergies of meaningful movement, we approach veritable 
understandings of mind. We find that those synergies of meaningful 
movement are orchestrated not by an embodied mind but by a mindful body, 
alive to and cognizant to its surrounding world and developing fundamental 
abilities to move effectively and efficiently within it from infancy and in fact 
from in utero onward.
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